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IN THE SUPREMR COTJRT OF '!'HE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Responnent,

••

-v-

••

THOMAS P. DYER,

case No • 18337

••

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF'

••

OF RESPONnENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was originally charged with Murder in the
second degree, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah
coae Ann.

~

7n-5-203 (lq53), as amended, in the shooting

death of Nina Marie Fuelleman.

The charge was later amended

to manslaughter, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Cone

Ann.,~

76-~-2ns

(1953), as amenaen.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COTJRT
Appellant was tried without a jury on March 3 and 4,
1982, the Honorable J. Robert Rullock presiding, in the Fourth

Judicial District Court.

Appellant was convicted of

manslaughter on March 4, 1Q02.

Sentence of one year in the

Utah county Jail and a $1,000 fine were imposed on March 2n,
1982.

A Certificate of Probable Cause was granted on April

13, 198?. ann execution of the sentence stayed pendinq this

appeal.
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REI.1 IRF ROUGHT ON APPF.AL

Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment of the court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of August 20, 19A2, appellant, his
brother Rob, and Nina Fuelleman went to a private club in
American Fork for cocktails (R. 2A6).

All three drank and Rob

testified that he was mildly intoxicated, but that appellant
"was in the bag" (R. 286, 304).

nn the way home, at

approximately l:no to 1:15 a.m. of August 21, appellant
the car (R. 2R7, 28R).

~rove

When the three reached the house in

which appellant and Rob lived, appellant announced he was
going to his girlfriend's home and Roh took the car keys away
from him (R. 284, 288).

An argument ensued in which appellant

threw money and crumpled checks at Rob (R. 28q).

Rob grabbed

appellant hy the throat because he "couldn't get a word in
edqewise" and proceeded to strangle and hit appellant
2qn).

(~.

~RQ-

A neighbor testified that she heard male voices coming

from Rob and appellant's house at approximately 1:30 a.m., a
minute or two after she observed people getting out of a car
and entering the house (R. 277, 27R).

The voices were saying

"I'm going to get this Fucking thing over with.

I'm tired of

being lied to." " I haven't been lying to you."

"The Fuck you

haven't" (R. 279).

-2-
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After hitting appellant several times, Rob let him
go because he "felt sorry for taking advantage of him" (R.
290).

Less than 30 seconds after the fighting stopped, Rob

went to the doorway of appellant's hedroom and saw him backing
out of the closet with a gun in his hand (R.

~91-292).

The

gun was a 30-30 caliber Winchester Western rifle CR. 314).
Approximately 10 seconds later, :R.ob saw the gun explode (R.
294).

Appellant was stanning near a dresser, the top arawer

of which was standinq open when the police officers arrived,
when the shot was fired (R. 240-241, 292).

The drawer

contained two spent cartridges and a box of 30-30 caliber
ammunition (R. 241).

On the floor, near the closet, was a gun

scabbara (R. 23Q; see also Exhibit 14).

Rob testified that

the gun was heln above appellant's hip hut below his shoulder
(R. 297).

Rob did not see or hear the gun being loaded or

cocked nor did he remember anything being said by an)1one
during that time (R.

2~7).

The neighbor testified that she

heard a male voice say "Fuck.

Not that.

not that.

Oh, my

god, not that" just before she heara the gunshot (R. 2RO).
when the gun fired, the bullet struck the door frame
approximately 5 feet above the floor (R. 246).

After passing

through the door frame, the jacket separated from the slug
247).

(R

The jacket struck Nina Fuellernan in the face and the

slug stuck in the opposite wall and later fell to the floor
(R.• 219, 225, 24C').

Rob testified that Nina had been upstairs
-3-
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during the fight an<l that he was not aware she had come
downstairs until he saw her on the floor after the shot (R.
299).

The.gun had been pointed in Roh's direction when it

fired, and the bullethole in the door frame was only two feet
from him

(R.

29R, 312).

Rob said, however, that he was never

frightened and that the argument was over by the time he went
to appellant's bedrOOJT\ ( R. 3 OR-_}09 , 311) •
A gunsmith testified that the gun involved was in
perfect conaition (R. 263).

The trigger pull had been

lightened by a gunsmith from the factory setting but was
average for a rifle that had been worked on by a gunsmith (R.
263,

Many rifles have trigger pulls that are as much as

2~6).

one pound lighter than this one (R. 266).

The triqger pull

was heavy enough that it would take a conscious effort to pull
the trigger

(R.

263).

The rifle coulnn't be fired without

pulling the trigger and the hammer wouldn't fall without
pulling the trigger (R. 26R).
Appellant at first told the police that he and Rob
were discussing the deer hunt and admiring the gun when it
went off accidentally (R. 2nq, 300), but appellant did not
testify at trial.

Rob, however, saio that he heard appellant

tell that story to the police, that it was not true, ann that
he was surprised when appellant said it

(R.

300).

Exhihits

17, 18 and lQ show that the line of fire based on the angle of
the bullethole through the wall would be consistent with the
-4-
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rifle being held at or just below the shoulder in an aimed
position.

Conflicting testimony was given indicating that the

gun may have been held in a lower position when it fired (R.
3 29).
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT MAY, AT ITS nISCRETION,

CONSIDER A LF.SSF.R INCLUnED OFFENSE WHETHER
REO.UESTED BY DEFF!NSE COUNSEL OR NOT.
Appellant assigns error to the trial court's
consideration of a lesser offense incluned within the offense
chargen because, appellant asserts, it denied him the benefit
of resting on his theory of the case; i.e., that he was
totally innocent of any wrongdoing.

Such an attempt at

alleging error has previously been considered and rejected by
this Court.
In State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91 (1982), the
defendant, faced with charges of first- and second-degree
murder ana attempted murner, chose to oppose instructions on
the lesser included offenses of manslaughter and attempted
manslaughter in the hope of escaping all criminal liahility.
This Court, in determining that the trial court could properly
instruct on the lesser incluc1ea offense, sain:
If one were to view a trial as a strictly
adversarial contest or combat between two
parties, one could argue that a defendant
-~-
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should have the right to win or lose
solely on the basis of what the
prosecution has chargen. However, a
criminal trial is much more than just a
contest between the State and an
individual which is determined by
strategies appropriate to determining the
outcome of a game. A primary purpose of a
criminal trial is the vindication of the
laws of ·a civilized society against those
who are guilty of transgressing those
laws.
•

•

•

[Wlhen evidence of a defendant's criminal
conduct has been placed before a court of
justice, even though that con~uct has not
been specifically chargeo, it would be a
mockery of our criminal laws for a court
to ignore a proved crime and acquit on the
charged crime, when the defendant is not
prejudiced in presenting a full ana
complete defense to the proved crime.
Id. at 94, 95.

The Court went on to say that:

Under the Utah definition of a lesser
included offense, there can be no
unfairness to the defendant in giving a
lesser included offense in~truction
because of lack of notice or preparation
since no element may be includeo in the
lesser offense that is not included in the
greater offense [citations and footnote
omitted].
Id. at 95.

Thus, the Court held that it is proper for a trial

court to give a lesser included offense instruction, even
though the defendant objects, if he is afforded a "full and
fair opportunity to defend himself."

Id.

In the instant case

there was no jury to instruct: however, it is also proper for
a judge, sitting as the fact finder, to consider a lesser
included offense when the circumstances of the case indicate
-6-
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that the defendant may be guilty of the lesser offense even
though he is not guilty of the offense charged.
Appellant further claims that the consideration of
the lesser offense in this case twice placed him in jeopardy
for the same offense.

However, that proposition does not

apply to the facts of this case.

It cannot be sain that

appellant was placed in double jeopardy where he was not
acquitted of the charge of manslaughter and then rechargen in
a new information with that same offense.

'Rather, the

appellant here was found guilty of a different, lesser offense
than that chargeo, albeit on the same set of facts, within the
same proceeoing and without a new information.

To hold that

the finding of guilt in this case constituted nouble jeopardy
would be to hold that no defendant could ever be found guilty
of a lesser included offense because the fact finder must
first find him not guilty of the offense charged.

Such a

result flies in the face of the concepts of justice and fair
oealing accepted by our courts.
Whitman, q3 Utah 557, 74
States, 355

u.s.

P.2~

6~6

See, generally, State v.
(1Q3~}~

Green v. United

184 (1957).

Appellant further claims that respondent's brief in
State v. Boggess, Utah, 655 P.2d 6~4 (1982), supports his
position that the trial court may not consider a lesser
included offense absent a specific request hy the defendant.
That case, however, arose in a different context from the case
at bar.

In Boggess, the defendant did not request an
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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instruction on the lessr included offense and none was given.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that it was error not to
consider a lesser offense in such a situation.

Boggess,

therefore, is not apposite to this case.
POINT II
NEGLIGF.NT HOMICIDE IS A LESSER OFFENSE
INCLUOED IN THE OFFENSR OF MANSLAUGHTER.

Utah Cone Ann.,

s

76-1-402 (1953), as amended, sets

out the requirements for lesser includeo offenses.

That

section provides, in pertinent part:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense includea in the offense charged
• • • An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charge~.

Appellant argues that a comparison of the elements of
manslaughter with the elements of negligent homicide results
in a finding that neqligent homicide is not a lesser offense
in manslaughter.

Such a comparison, however, results in a

finding that the difference between the two offenses is merely
one of degree rather than substance.

The elements of

manslaughter are as follows:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a) Recklessly causes the death of
another; or

-8-
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(b) Causes the death of another under
the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse;
(c) Causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a moral
or legal justification or extenuation for
his connuct although the conduct is not
legally justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.
Utah eoae Ann.,

~

76-5-205 (1953), as amended.

Negligent

homicide is defined as follows:
(1) Criminal ho~icine constitutes
negligent homicide if the actor, acting
with criminal negligence, causes the death
of another.
Utah Cone Ann.,

~

76-5-206

(19~3),

first contends that negligent

as amended.

ho~icine

Appellant

cannot be a lesser

included offense of manslaughter because subsections (b) and
(c) of the manslaughter statute require proof of facts other
than reckless conauct.

There is nothing, however, in the Utah

Cone that prevents one definition of a crime from including
lesser offenses that are not incluned within the alternate
definitions of the greater offense.

While negligent homicine

might not properly be considered where the facts of a
particular case support either alternative (b) or (c) of

~

76-

5-205, the facts of this case support only alternative (a).
There was nothing at trial that showed appellant suffered from
extreme Mental or emotional disturbance or that appellant felt
justified in the shooting neath of Nina

Fuelle~an.

Therefore,

-9-
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only alternative (a) need be considered in a comparison of the
two offenses.
The difference between the two offenses is that
manslaughter requires the actor to act recklessly and
negligent homicioe requires criminal negligence.

These two

terms are defined as follows:
A person engages in conduct:
•

•

•

(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when
he is aware of but consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would
exercise unaer all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he ought to
be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in
all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.
Utah Code

Ann.,~

76-2-103 (1953), as amended.

The only

difference between reckless and criminally negligent conduct
is whether a person perceives a risk and consciously
disregards it or fails to perceive a risk he ought to have

I

-In-

I
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been aware of.

The risk in hoth cases must be of such a

degree that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to
recognize it.

The distinction, then, is merely a matter of

proof of less or more facts estahlishing the mental state of
the actor and is one of degree; i.e., perception and disr·egard
or failure to perceive.
Appellant next cites State v. Howard, Utah, 59; P.2d
Ai~

(1979) as standing for the proposition that negligent

homicide is not a lesser offense included in manslaughter.
That, however, is not the holding of the case.

In Howaro,

this Court said that the failure to instruct on the lesser
included offense of negligent homicide was not error because
it was not supported by any reasonable view of the facts in
that case.

This holding does not rule out the inclusion of

negligent homicide as a lesser offense in other cases, only in
that case.
Last, appellant cites to respondP.nt's brief in State
v. Boggess, supra, to support his position that negligent
homicide is not a lesser includea offense.

Although the

respondent's brief in that case made a similar argument, it is
not applicable in the instant case.

This Court decided

Boggess on September 13, lqa2, ana specifically declined to
decine whether negligent homicine is a lesser included offense
because no "reasonable view of the evidence as to defenoant's
intent • • • [would] support a verdict of guilty of negligent
homicide."

Boggess at

6~5.

Justice Stewart, in his
-11-
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concurring opinion, however, arguen that negligent homicide is
a lesser included offense of manslaughter.

He said that:

The gravamen of the crime of negligent
homicide is the same as that for reckless
manslaughter. The only distinction
between the two crimes is the mental state
of the defendant at the time the crime was
committed.
In one, the actor perceives
the risk but unreasonably disregards it;
in the other, he simply negligently fails
to perceive the risk.
•

•

•

Courts generally have held that negligent
homicide is a lesser included offense of
reckless manslaughter.
~.<;., State v.
Parker, 128 ~riz. lo;, ~24 ~.2a 304
(1~80); Lowe v. State, 2~4 Ark. ~05, 570
~.w.2a ?.53 <l9iR); Till v. People, Colo.,
~Al P.2d 299 (1978); State v. Smith, Conn.
441 A.2d R4 (1Q81); People v. Strong, 3;
N.Y.2d 56A, 338 N.E.2d 602, 376 N.Y.S.2d
87 (197~); ~tate v. Cameron, 121 N.H. 348,
430 A.2d 138 (19Rl); Aliff v. State, Tex.
er. App., 62? s.w.2n 166 (19R2). see
State v. Mattingly, ~3 Or. App. 173, 541
P.2d 1063 (l9i5).
Boggess at 65'5, Stewart, J. (concurring).

In a further

clarification, lJustice Stewart stated that:
The difference between negligence and
recklessness is not marken by a sharp
analytical line.
On the contrary, the
difference generally lies in making a
judgment as to where on a continuum of
unreasonable conduct one's behavior passes
from negligence to recklessness.
In
essence, it is a matter of judqing when
conduct is no longer just gray but dark
gray.
Id. at 65R.

Because the difference in proof of negligent

homicide and manslaughter lies merely upon the mental state

-12-
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of the actor, the former is a lesser offense included within
the latter.

Roth offenses require proof of the same facts

outside of the mental state.

The mental state required for

negligent homicide is different from that required for
manslaughter only in degree of perception of the risk.

For

this reason, it was proper for the trial judge, sitting as a
fact finder, to consider negligent homicide as a lesser
included offense in this case.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A
VERDICT OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
Lastly, appellant contends that the evidence
presented at trial is insufficient to justify his conviction
of negligent homicide as a matter of law.

This contention

presumes that the fact finder must believe the evidence most
favorable to appellant and ignore that which was unfavorable.
The mere existence, however, of conflicting evidence or
inferences is not sufficient to overturn a conviction.

It is

the finner of fact who is entitled to determine the
credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence.

The

evidence need not be "wholly conclusive" but neea only he
sufficient to support a finding by this Court that "reasonable
minds would [not] entertain a reasonable douht as to guilt."
see state v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982): and cases
cited therein.
-13-
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Clearly, there is sufficient evia nee in this case
to support the verdict.

That evidence is that:

(1) Appellant

knew that Nina Fuelleman was somewhere in the house auring the
argunent between Rob and himself because the three had come
home together (R. 2R5-2RR); (2) immediately following the
argument, appellant went to his bedroom and took out the rifle
(R.

291-2~2);

(3) live ammunition was found near where

appellant was standing when the gun fired, supporting the
inference that appellant loaded the gun or knew it was loaded
(R. 241); (4) appellant was pointing the gun in the direction

of his brother when it fired (R. 312); (5) the gun could not
have fired unless the trigger were pulled with a conscious
effort (R.

2~3);

(6) the rifle was held at or near the

shoulner, supporting the inference that appellant was aiming
or attempting to aim the gun when it fired (R. 297; see also
Exhibits 17, 18 ann 19); (7) appellant lied to the police
about why he was holding the gun, supporting the inference
that the gun aid not fire accidentally (R. 209, 30n); and (0)
the gun was firen while appellant held it, killing Nina
Fuelleman (R. 294, 297).
From these facts, the trial court coulo very well
have determined that if appellant was not aware of the risk
that Nina Fuelleman would be killed by the discharge of the
rifle, he should have been aware of that risk.

Even if

appellant was not aware of the risk that the gun was loaded,
he should have been aware of that risk and therefore of the
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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further risk that the gun would fire and someone might be
killed.

Reasonable minds could not entertain a reasonable

doubt that.appellant was guilty of negligent homicide in
failing to perceive such a risk.

For this reason, the

judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is within the trial junge's discretion to
consider a lesser included offense where the interests of
justice require it, even though the defense counsel does not
request such a consideration and even though he may object.
Recause negligent homicide is a lesser offense included within
the offense of manslaughter and there was sufficient evinence
to support a finding of guilty of negligent homicide, the
trial court did not err in considering negligent homicide as
the offense of which appellant was guilty nor in finding him
guilty.

For these reasons, the judgment of the court below

-ft

should be af firmeO.
Respectfully suhmitted this

10

day of March,

1983.
DAVID L. WIL~INSON
Attorney General

ROBP.RT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
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